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Abstract—In this paper we present the Privacy Dashboard – a
tool designed to inform and empower the people using mobile
devices, by introducing features such as Remote Privacy Protec-
tion, Backup, Adjustable Location Accuracy, Permission Control
and Secondary-User Mode. We have implemented our solution
on FirefoxOS and conducted user studies to verify the usefulness
and usability of our tool. The paper starts with a discussion of
different aspects of mobile privacy, how users perceive it and
how much they are willing to give up for better usability. Then
we describe the tool in detail, presenting what incentives drove
us to certain design decisions. During our studies we tried to
understand how users interact with the system and what are
their priorities. We have verified our hypothesis, and the impact
of the educational aspects on the decisions about the privacy
settings. We show that by taking a user-centric development of
privacy extensions we can reduce the gap between protection and
usability.
I. INTRODUCTION
User activities are shifting from personal computers to
smartphones. Studies show that more Internet accesses are
made from mobile devices than from desktops, especially in
emerging markets [1]. It is often said, however, that users
do not care about their privacy. On the other hand, when
not in the virtual world, they tend to preserve their personal
information – hide their diaries, avoid disclosing certain in-
formation in front of strangers, protect their correspondence.
Our hypothesis is that when it comes to the mobile reality,
the problem lays in the lack of intuitive privacy protection
mechanisms and education of the users. This hypothesis seems
to be supported by the public reaction to the PRISM [2] and
articles on surveillance published in mass media, like “Der
Spiegel” [3] or “The Guardian” [4].
Existing tools do not give full and easily understandable
information about good privacy practices, nor do they allow
to control the phone sufficiently [5]. Our aim is to help
users by increasing the perception and awareness of potential
risks, along with designing mechanisms to protect against
information leakage. In this paper we will discuss an approach
to design and development of privacy-preserving tools. We
call it the “User-centric privacy development”, which is further
discussed in the next section. In Section III we discuss work in
both academia and the industry on the topic of mobile privacy.
Then, in Section IV we will move to the description of the
study we have performed to find the needs and expectations
of users with respect to the privacy preservation on mobile
phones. In Section V we will present the design that we
have developed to meet the results of the initial study. The
Privacy Dashboard, as we call it, was implemented to work
with Firefox OS, and its details will be shown in Section VI.
Next, in Section VII we describe the verification study. Finally
in Section VIII we will talk about the results and insights
we have gained from our work – user behavior and patterns
when using tools like ours. We finish in Section IX with some
conclusions.
The contributions of the paper, are as follows: (1) We formu-
late and realize a user-driven, approach to the design of multi-
feature privacy tool.(2) We identify what is the gap between
the users’ expectations and the actual data protection on the
system. (3) To this end we design and implement features that
address the problems (like Remote Privacy Protection, Backup,
Adjustable Location Accuracy, Permission Control and Guest
Mode) that we combine in the Privacy Dashboard, which we
then (4) evaluate with extensive user-studies.
II. USER-CENTRIC APPROACH
User-centered design (UCD) emerged from Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) and is a software design method-
ology for developers and designers. It helps them make appli-
cations that meet the needs of their users [6]. The approach
of UCD is created in three main iterative steps as requirement
for exploration, design research and evaluation.
We found that people have a certain expectation of privacy,
but they don’t know how to enforce it on their smartphones.
We adopted UCD to bridge the gap between people’s expecta-
tions and the actual workings of the device. In order to achieve
this goal, we make iterations of user studies and technical
work as shown in Figure 1. We have used the approach to
create a more generic Privacy Dashboard. The same scheme,
Fig. 1: UCD development of Privacy Dashboard
however, can be used to develop single features. We have
started off by initial user study where we gather the guidelines
for the planned solution. We check what do they expect from
the tools they get; how do they use the device; how does
their understanding of the system differ from the reality; what
is their attitude to the problem. Based on the initial studies,
we can create a set of paradigms that the system should, but
is not, fulfilling. Next, rather than focusing on the technical
details, we want to provide multiple versions and possibilities
that address the same problems, and verify how people feel
about them. Having an extensive prototype implementation
and previous results, we can create the questionnaire and
design the test scenarios, to give us in-depth review of our
approach. As a result of the second phase of user studies we
improve the model and finalize the tool.
III. RELATED WORK
We would like to present work done in the academia in the
fields of both user studies and the tools, as well as a brief
analysis of apps available on the market for Android and iOS.
A. On users perception
To build with a user-centric approach we use the knowledge
gathered in the field of information and data sharing, as well as
people’s awareness of privacy issues. In [7] the authors present
insights into up-to-date mobile device sharing behavior. Their
work analyzes users’ concerns with respect to data and device
sharing. This gives basis for creating our own user studies for
Privacy Dashboard, and Guest Mode in particular.
Another work was presented by Keng et al in [8]. They
have demonstrated the feasibility and benefits of identifying
the causes of leaks from a user’s point of view, which they call
mobile forensics of privacy leaks. Not only can they correlate
user actions to leaks, but also report the causes from a user-
oriented perspective.
Insights into users’ behavior and perception of mobile
privacy are given in [9], [10], [11], [12]. We have based our
plans and approach on these works.
A study presented in [13] by Keith et al. proposes and
tests a more realistic experimental methodology designed to
replicate real perceptions of privacy risk and capture the
effects of actual information disclosure decisions. Another
paper by Jialiu Lin, [12], addresses this gap through the study
of mobile app privacy preferences with the dual objective of
both simplifying and enhancing mobile app privacy decision
interfaces.
B. On tools
Academia is addressing the issue of mobile privacy. There
are, however, very few tools available which would allow to
control the privacy settings of the phone, or extend the level
to which we can influence the data exchange.
In [14] the authors describe a “Privacy Panel App” in which
they represent computed ratings of privacy impact. These are
offered in a graphical user-friendly format and help the users
in defining policies based on them. This is an interesting idea
of how to create a tool that would be useful for an average
user, as well as allow him to get an overview of what does
his phone do. However, the authors do not provide methods
to empower the user, instead showing him what is happening
on his phone.
Works like [15], [16], [17], [18] present solutions to
partial problems – location blurring, secure communication,
encryption on mobile devices. However these are scattered
around and would be hard to combine into a single tool.
C. System Settings on Android and iOS
With the introduction of iOS 8, Apple decided to take a big
step and change their privacy policy. In an official statement
they have promised to no longer unlock iOS 8 devices for
law enforcement [19]. This is a change in the practices of
a company that was well known to collaborate with all sort
of government institutions [20]. They have also been fixing
a set of vulnerabilities that have been detected by external
experts [21]. There is an extensive privacy tab, where users can
choose which apps have access to which sensitive resources –
Location Services, Contacts, Photos, Microphone, etc. There
is also a possibility of limiting the Ad Tracking and activating
a Find my Device feature. User can choose what, if anything,
will be uploaded to the iCloud – the backup mechanism for
iPhone. However, the control given to the user is very binary
– either you reveal location to an app or you block it – there is
no method of “fuzzing” the position of the phone. Also there
are services like “Share my location” or “Find my Friends”
and it is quite hard to find the place where one could disable
the feature. Moreover, there is no explanation as to what each
element does, and no information on why an app would need
access to certain information, which may actually fully justify
the request.
Android is not a particularly privacy friendly system. The
privacy settings built into the OS are very limited and well
hidden. There was a moment, in version 4.3 of the system,
when an app called App Ops [22] was available. It provided
information about what the phone did and what resources
did it access. With Android permission model, however, there
is no way to cherry-pick the elements app can access. The
decision is made during the installation process and is a binary
Fig. 2: The concept of the introductory study and the key
results of each step for the user-centered design process
one. Notably, App Ops did not provide any ability to control
whether an application should have access to the Internet. It
was also not possible to prevent apps from uniquely identifying
a device, or its owner, via third party accounts. This means that
an app could still tie together all of the account identities on
the device and access IMEI and other unique device identifiers
with the appropriate permissions.
IV. INTRODUCTORY STUDY
We have presented the literature overview and the general
concept of user-centric privacy design in previous sections.
Let us now move to the discussion of the realization of such
model.
A. Methodology
The introductory study was split into two parts and a result
summary, as presented in Figure 2. We recruited twenty-
four users over social media channels to join a focus group.
We chose the participants as “every day experts” – people
between 20 and 40 years old, that were evaluated to have
average knowledge about mobile phones and data privacy. The
group was selected to eliminate people with highly specialized
technical background. The goal of this first session was to
identify needs and fears, motivation barriers as well as general
comprehension and mental models that users have about
privacy on mobile phones. All “everyday experts” owned a
smartphone for at least 1 year and used a variety of services
like email, instant messaging, or navigation regularly. The first
session was conducted some days prior to the second phase to
allow for analysis of the group work as input to the next step.
In the second part of the study, everyday experts teamed
up with product and engineering experts from the field of
security and privacy. First, we wanted experts to hear from
users about privacy and learn how users’ mental models work
to be able to use this input for the user-centered development
process. Second, an everyday expert and one member of the
Product group paired up to develop communication about
privacy features.
B. Results
Users reported having dilemmas with respect to sharing
their private data. However, they tend to accept non-transparent
privacy policies rather than taking actions or opting-out from
a service. Three principals describe the main needs that users
have about privacy: feeling in control, ease of use, and taking
actions.
From a user perspective, sharing data on the Internet is an
ambivalent issue, as we have seen in our study. On one hand,
users believe that a service will only work, or at least work
better, if they disclose their personal data to it or accept the
private data collection. On the other, people are aware of the
threats that sharing data poses, thus they tend to be uneasy
about it. We could identify three main categories of complaints
that users had:
1) Users commonly reported that they do not trust apps that
do not state clearly why they request access to the data, or what
the consequences of such sharing are (“I am worried when I
need to share data, that it absolutely irrelevant to a service that
I want to use.”, “I feel uncomfortable when services use my
data for creating personalized advertisement.”, “Why does a
service need to check my email contacts at first time use?”).
2) Fears are caused by a brand that offer the service and its
image (“I am worried when brands whose services I use get
negative press in the media.”, “[This company] is known for
bad habits against their employees, I assume they also take
user data best practices not too serious.”).
3) The third category, however, comes from lack of educa-
tion. People worry that they do not know and understand how
an app works or how to use it.
While working with both regular users and the technical
experts, we were surprised to see that the motivation not only
to question the validity of the data sharing, but also to search
for alternative services is low: “Eventually, there is no chance
not to use this service, so I disclose all the data knowing that
this might be wrong”. What we have seen is that users start to
accept that the Internet does not work without sharing personal
data (“Nowadays in the Internet you cannot expect to know
who is on the other side of the screen. That’s part of using
the Internet.”). Moreover, people do not value their personal
data (“I don’t care if somebody gets all my data from this
service.”, “I have nothing to hide.”). Finally, most participants
confirmed, that they prefer to outsource to the technical experts
the problem of data privacy. They are willing to trust the
“experts” to create systems that protect their information. They
are willing to give up part of the usability for privacy, but not
so much that they would not be able to use a service any
more.
V. DESIGN
We identified problems that were common to certain groups
– basic users, technology aware people and advanced. Depend-
ing on the attitude and knowledge, the expectations of the
system were different – some people would prefer to sacrifice
privacy in order to be easily reachable, while others would
much rather limit the information sharing to the minimum.
A. Problem statement
In order to verify our user-centric approach we decided
to focus on the basic user. People in this group have little
to no technical knowledge, might be first-time smartphone
users, believe that either technology is scary or very safe and
protective. The common threats we have initially identified
are two-fold: on one hand people feel like they do not have
enough knowledge about good privacy practices, on the other
– even if they do, they do not feel in control over the phone.
Our report showed that:
• Users want personal information to be safe and secure,
especially when a device is lost or stolen.
• Users want to know their data will not be inadvertently
exposed to unauthorized people.
• Theft of devices, resulting in loss of personal data, is a
common problem on emerging markets.
• Users want control, but also need help in setting up and
managing their devices and data.
B. Requirements
In a user-centric solution we need to assure high technical
quality and be aware of the risks. However, it is also very
important not to approach the problem from strict security
research point of view sacrificing the usability. There are
elements that have to be accounted for when designing our
tool:
• We will be working with low-in-computational power
devices
• The tool has to be as protective as possible, within the
legal limits in a variety of countries.
• As a result – the tool will not protect from legal inter-
ception, or other governmental surveillance methods.
• The main purpose is not only to empower the users, but
also to make them aware of the threats – so that they can
adjust their everyday practices.
• The tool has to ensure a high quality of technical solutions
– half-baked privacy is worse then no privacy.
C. Capabilities
To address the issues described in Sections V-A and V-B we
decided that the tool should offer the following capabilities:
1) Guided Tour: One of the first things that showed up
in our research was a lack of understanding and knowledge
on good privacy practices. Almost all people, despite their
initial technical skills, feel lost. The Guided Tour (GT) is
a set of explanatory screens that discusses the capabilities
and offers explanation on what features Dashboard introduces.
After completing the Tour, user can enter the main panel and
proceed with the set-up. Later, at any moment if one feels
like he needs help, he can re-enter the Guided Tour on chosen
topic.
2) Lost or stolen device control: First and foremost the user
should be able to track his device – when one loses the phone
out of sight, he should command it to report back where it is.
Second, until the device is found, it should lock itself remotely
with the passphrase – so as long as it is out of user’s control, no
one else should be able to access it. Also despite the locating
abilities, it has to be possible to wipe the data from the phone
– in case the phone gets permanently stolen, the best we can
do is protect our privacy.
3) Geolocation privacy: The Directive on privacy and
electronic communications [23] states that the location-based
services (LBS) must be permission-based. Thus, since 2002,
the user must opt-in in order to use the LBS. A common solu-
tion is to turn it off. But that makes some apps, navigation for
instance, unusable. Moreover, in many cases, the application
highly benefits from roughly knowing where the user is, but
doesn’t necessarily need to know his precise coordinates.
4) Controlling apps: Users have no control what infor-
mation is shared and when. Even if they take part in the
decision process – while installing an Android App, user
needs to agree to the permissions it requests – they never
know when the actual accesses are happening and why. A
study by Consolvo et al [24] around location sharing, showed
that the decision people make about the permission granting
depends on the context: who was requesting it, why did they
ask for it, and how detailed the information should be. The
Privacy Dashboard should thus introduce a good overview
of what each app is doing and when, to provide basis for
an informed decision on allowing or withdrawing access to
certain resources.
5) Sharing devices with friends and family: It is not very
rare that one wants or needs to share their phone with someone
else. Nevertheless, the data we store on mobile devices should
not be exposed to anyone random. Although the concept of a
“Guest Mode” is well established on PCs, on mobile phones
we lack some kind of a Secondary-user Mode, which would
allow the owner of the device to borrow it to others, without
worrying about his personal data. Limited functionality is
offered by Apple [25] (under the name “Guided Access”) and
Android [26].
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
It is not the scope of this paper to present each solution in
great detail – every one of them carries some sophisticated
challenges. As we focus on the general approach of user-
centric tool development, this section will include the imple-
mentation details that are important to the approach. We have
decided to work on Firefox OS, as it is an open source system,
available on phones in the emerging markets. It allowed us to
adjust and change the system to our will. Moreover we wanted
to test our solution with the people who have less experience
with smartphones and the privacy threats they pose.
A. Guided Tour
The Guided Tour was mostly a communication challenge.
We had to investigate how do we explain the technical aspects
of the Privacy Dashboard to the average user. What language
should be used in order to inform, and not to scare. We have
done extensive literature study on the decision making process
and the psychology of judgment. Work by Mellers et al. [27]
provided great guidance in the field.
Fig. 3: First couple wireframes of Guided Tour. Each panel
consists of a graphical illustration that provides suggestion
about the topic, a title and a short explanation. Instead of
simply describing the feature, the Guided Tour gives the
consequences of the decision.
There are three main elements involved in the decision
making: the risk perception, the risk attitude and the emotions.
It is an obvious, yet important realization: not only emotions
have high impact on decisions, but also the results of our
decisions have powerful effect on our emotions. Surprisingly
framing effects, stimulus contexts, environments, and response
modes can have a big influence on the decision making. Of
course, rules and habits also play a great role in the process.
All this gave us a good understanding on how to educate
people about good privacy practices. It was clear that the
message has to be short and simple. It has to carry some emo-
tional load, and give the sense of participating in something
interesting and exciting. Additionally suggestions that guide
people should be made, giving them a reference point.
We decided to introduce characters that will be the guides
during the exploration of privacy settings. Each screen of
the Guided Tour consists of a graphic that shows one of
our characters in a situation that gives an intuition about
the explanation. The text is short and serves the purpose of
discussing the feature, giving reasons why it is important and
consequences of the decision.
We introduced two versions of the Guided Tour: one that
was interactive and allowed for adjusting the settings while
reading about them, and second where the user could only
read the explanation. During the second study the users chose
the latter, as can be seen in the Figure 3. We also included the
possibility of sharing the privacy settings with other members.
This allows users to follow the guidance from the people they
trust – be it their IT friend or recommendation of the favorite
social network.
B. Remote Privacy Protection
When we ask people what are their anxieties in mobile
world, many mention losing their phone. However, when we
talk about privacy in the context of existing tracking solutions,
users have doubts about registering in order to connect your
device to the online identity: both iOS and Android require the
owner to create an account during the first time use. During our
initial study, we found one statement very inspiring: “Trust is
something that is earned, not enforced. Why do everyone take
my trust in technology for granted”. Coming from the account-
less approach we have created a tool that allows manipulating
the device with the use of short text messages. When initially
starting the Remote Privacy Protection (RPP) feature, user is
asked to create a passphrase. This code is later used as the
protection mechanism to block changing of the settings, and
to identify the owner of the device. Next user will enter simple
view where he can choose which commands does he want to
activate through the SMSes. The possibilities are: locate, lock,
ring and wipe. When the phone is lost, user can use any device
he has at hand, including some free online services, and send
a message to his number. The message should be formatted
as:
ˆrpp \s(lock—ring—locate) \s([a-z0-9]1,100)$/i
Every time there is an incoming message, an event listener
in the Remote Privacy Protection checks if it starts with the
keyword and if it does – it will handle the verification process.
When the command is correct, and the passphrase matches the
one set by the user, device will act accordingly:
• Lock – phone turns on the lock screen with a passphrase.
• Locate – the phone sends out the current geoposition and
locks itself. It is still responsive to new locate commands.
• Ring – the phone locks itself and activates the ringer with
the highest possible volume.
As any approach this method has its drawbacks, most of
which come from the fact that we do not want to limit the
communication only to phones with the app installed, but
allow for sending out the SMS from virtually any device.
First problem is the visibility of the incoming text messages.
Although most devices support hidden SMSes, none of them
does it by default. That is why we cannot rely on this feature.
It means, however, that the incoming text will be displayed
on the stolen phone, hinting the attacker that someone is
manipulating it. It also means that we cannot set passphrases
in the commands, as the person holding the phone would
be able to learn it. This, and the problem of man-in-the-
middle attack, could be solved by encrypting the message.
Then the attacker would only see random characters. Again,
however, if we want to use standard Text App, independent
from the OS, there is no way of introducing an encryption
mechanism on the sender side. Last method that comes to
mind is usage of an authenticatior that generates one-time
passwords. One example could be the Google Authenticator1.
However this again creates the problem of synchronization and
1https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.
authenticator2
system dependance. In order to create a one-time password,
user would need to have a phone with the authenticator
app installed. We are in a process of creating a solution to
that problem, however it is too early to discuss the possible
mechanisms.
We handle these problems in a simple way. The passphrase
has to be set up during the first time use, and can be as long
as 100 characters. Once the device is found and the correct
passphrase is entered, the app resets itself and asks for a new
passphrase. The new entry is compared with the old one so
that the user cannot enter the same value twice in a row.
C. Backup
Giving the users a choice, whom to trust with data, led to
another improvement in privacy protection. We have created
a backup mechanism that allows to choose where the data
would be stored. With the Privacy Dashboard, user is able to
pick the location – be it default Mozilla server, some popular
storage provider, or his own computer. This solution has little
technical challenges, and rather extends the functionality.
D. Adjustable Location Accuracy
The concept of blurring the position of a user, so that not
every application has his precise coordinates is very appealing
to most people [28]. We have to work within the legal limits,
so we cannot influence the way the phone reports its position
to the network operator. We can, however, change the API
in such a way that the location is adjusted according to the
settings, and we also can try using different proxy servers to
hide the IP address.
In the Privacy Dashboard, the user can choose the accuracy
of the location services on per-application basis:
• Turn Location Off allows the user to not give any
location data at all.
• Give Precise Location leaves the system without any
changes.
• Choose a Position allows the user to fix his position
to a set of coordinates. We provide a list of predefined
values and a search that allows to find a City or Country
(where the coordinates are set to the center of mass of
the place). Additionally the user can enter custom latitude
and longitude.
• Blur by X km here the user chooses the distance by
which his position will be randomized. The choice is
flexible and can vary from 1 to 500 km.
To avoid some side channel timing attacks in every case we
allow the geolocation API to obtain the position. Next, we
verify what app is calling the API and check what is the setting
for it, and adjust the response the API would give. As the
application is not aware of the process and gets valid data,
app cannot find out if the blurring or fake location is turned
on. The basic concept is presented in the Figure 4.
In order to introduce the blurring we divide the world into
a grid. Its size is defined by the user, and can be different for
every app. We then determine the cell in which the phone
is, and return the middle of the cell. As long as the user
Fig. 4: Simplified mechanism of Adjustable Location Accu-
racy. We provide the decison on a global and per-app basis.
User can choose a separate setting for each app: “no location”,
when the Latitude and Longitude are set to null, “adjusted”
where we use fuzzing algorithm, “custom” where the location
is set to a pre defined position, and “precise”.
stays within that cell, the position reported to the app will
not change. When he moves to the next one the coordinates
will also change to the middle point of the new cell.
E. Advanced Secondary-User Mode
Elements under protection of the Secondary-User Mode can
be divided into three groups: apps, data and resources. The
applications installed on the phone carry a lot of information
about the owner of the device. Suffice it to say, advertisement
libraries which allow for targeted advertising send out to the
potential clients not only the location, gender, or age of the
device’s user, but also the list of installed applications [29].
For that reason in the Advanced Secondary-User Mode (SUM)
users can decide which apps will be not only accessible, but
also visible on the phone. This means that after entering the
Secondary-User Mode the apps will disappear from the screen,
and from the internal search engine. There is a list of pre-
defined apps that will always be removed, like the Settings
and the Privacy Dashboard (since the person using our phone
should not be allowed to change any options).
Upon entering the Secondary-user mode, the data stored in
each of defined elements is substituted with an empty list,
just as if no-one ever used the phone. Once the phone is
handed back to the owner, the original information is restored.
The databases include Contacts, Call History, SMS History, E-
mails, Photos, Browser History. Lastly there is a possibility of
limiting the access to the resources, like WiFi, Cellular Data
etc.
The Secondary-User mode covers multiple use-cases. On
one hand it may be used as a “guest mode” to hand over a
device for a short period of time. Secondly, it may be used as a
permanent solution of parental control – here the parent would
create a profile for the child and lock it down. This way the
functions can be unlocked as the child grows. Lastly, when
properly handled, Secondary-user Mode could be a mobile
equivalent of “incognito mode” in web browsers.
VII. USER STUDY
Having the prototype implemented, that based on our initial
research, next step in the user-centric approach was to conduct
a structured usability lab study of 26 users. We were mostly
interested in answering three research questions:
• Does our Privacy Dashboard bridge the gap, and meets
users’ expectations?
• What are users’ learnability, performance and satisfaction
using the privacy features?
• Does the Guided Tour work? Does it actually have impact
on people’s awareness? Do they accept it?
We started by recording the time required to go through the
Guided Tour, as well as looking into the users’ attitude and
behavior while configuring privacy settings. Next we verified
the ease of learning and use of privacy settings, along with the
peoples’ satisfaction of performing the task, global satisfaction
connected to the features and their comments. Each participant
learned and performed tasks on an Alcatel One Touch phone
with Firefox OS operating system installed. Prior to the study,
we have obtained approval in a form of exempt protocol and
promised the results would be only used for research.
In total, we had 38% males and 62% females. Their ages
were well distributed. We had no participants under 17 or
above 55 years old. Most of them (38.5%) graduated from a
collage, and 30.8% of them were still in college. 19.2% had a
higher education level like a master degree. We had only one
participant who has never used a smartphone before.
Based on the background verification, we believe that the
opinions expressed and behaviors performed by the partici-
pants are representative across age groups, genders, and the
feature phone users in smartphone environment.
VIII. EVALUATION
To eliminate the bias towards difficulties using settings
caused by users’ own cognition and actions, we asked partici-
pants to respond to the questions with regard to using settings
in general. We have used the seven-point Likert scale [30]
to formulate subjective responses (1- Strongly disagree, 2-
Disagree, 3- Somehow disagree, 4- Neither agree nor disagree,
5- Somehow agree, 6- Agree, 7- Strongly agree). Overall, we
found that people didn’t agree that it is difficult to understand
categories and functions in Settings on their smartphone (Me-
dian = 2). Moreover they did not have problems with locating
specific settings on the device(Median = 2). Interestingly, users
Fig. 5: Categories and Features. The figure presents the way
participants categorized each of the features included in the
Privacy Dashboard. Not all of them were considered privacy
oriented.
did not admit to having difficulties with finding help when
stumbling on a problem(Median = 3).
A. Categorization of the features
In the next step we have asked the participants to fill
out a pre-test questionnaire. They were supposed to assign
features to categories, decide to which privacy level each
feature belongs, grade different wireframe options based on
good design and bad design, and express comments.
First, we asked the users to put each privacy feature into
a different category. We have selected these basing on the
elements available in the settings of FirefoxOS: Network &
Connectivity, Personalization, Account Management, Privacy
& Security, Storage and Device. Each feature could be as-
signed more than once. We present the results in the Figure 5.
The values in the chart represent the percentage of choices
instead of participants. We have calculated the data based
on the number of choices. The Remote Privacy Protection
(RPP), in 30% of times categorized as Privacy & Security,
while 25% of choices would connect this feature to Network
& Connectivity. When asked to give justification, participants
suggested that RPP requires the connection to the network
to enable the remote control. 54% of choices were made
to assign Backup to the category of Storage. Although next
highest result, only 12% of the results put it in the category
Privacy & Security. 46%, and 38%, respectively, added both
Adjustable Location Accuracy (ALA) and Secondary-user
Mode (SUM) into the category of Privacy & Security. ALA
was also categorized as Network & Connectivity by 27%,
while SUM was placed in the Account Management in 31% of
cases. Participants reasoned that the real location information
was identified depending on the connectivity of GPS and
dispersed via network, thus the N&C choice. People were most
consequent when it came to the Guided Tour. 60% choices
stated that Guided Tour should belong to Device category.
Fig. 6: Learnability, performance and satisfaction of Privacy
Features. Dots represent the outliers, while stars denote ex-
treme score.
B. General Satisfaction with Privacy Features
We asked participants to respond to the Likert questionnaire
items with regard to the ease of learning, satisfaction of
performing tasks and overall satisfaction with the four features
(Remote Privacy Protection, Backup, Adjustable Location Ac-
curacy and Secondary-user Mode). We used seven-point scale
to formulate responses. Results showed that all participants
thought it was easy to learn, they were satisfied with perform-
ing the tasks and with features overall. The median scores
are all above 6. However, as shown in the Figure 6, more
participants gave higher marks towards the ease of learning
results, rather than the satisfaction of performing tasks and the
overall satisfaction, which reflects on the Adjustable Location
Accuracy and the Secondary-user Mode.
We asked users why do they give such scores. From the
comments we saw that users found the broad choice and
flexibility rather annoying. They did not like the idea of
making choice for each app separately. The study clearly
showed that the approach of global setting with an exception
list, or an opt out mechanism is much more efficient and
intuitive. People are used to exploratory study, so they do not
find it difficult to discover different options. We have also
decided to add a search function to the exception list. Users
reported that they clearly know which apps they would like to
choose, and a search mechanism speeds up the process.
C. Guided Tour
We used the same semantic differential technique to obtain
users’ feedback on the Guided Tour. The answers were formed
by a seven-point scale of semantic differential technique
with paring of “Difficult/Easy”, “unhelpful/helpful” and “Not
worthy/Worthy”.
1) General: Overall, as shown in the Figure 7, participants
thought that Guided Tour was easy to understand (Median = 6),
helpful (Median = 6), and worth reading (Median = 6). During
Fig. 7: Ease of use of Guided Tour. Users were asked to state
if it was “Easy to understand”, “Helpful” and “worth reading”.
Dots represent outliers while stars denote extreme scores.
the experiment, we asked the users to read the Guided Tour
before learning the features. They explored it by themselves
and spent the average reading time in the lab as 3m45s
(Standard Deviation: 1m45s). Comments were very positive
and encouraging: “It was very intuitive”, “Pictures help as
well”, and “Because I am a beginner of this function, I get
background information and useful explanations”.
2) Educational aspect of the Guided Tour: We also wanted
to know how successful we were in the task of educating the
users on the privacy threats. We have designed and developed
eight new statements to evaluate privacy concern of users.
These were divided into two, four-statement groups. First part
was answered at the stage of background questionnaire, and
second was evaluated at the end in the self-report question-
naire:
1) I am afraid what happens to my information in my
smartphone if I cannot find it or it is broken.
2) I do not like lending my phone because I do not want
anyone to access to information in my smartphone.
3) Providers of apps handle the information they collect
about users in an improper and distrust way.
4) Smart phone users have lost control over how data is
collected by providers of apps.
5) I found that my personal information in my phone will
be not safe if I cannot find my phone or it is broken.
6) I found that my personal information in my phone will
be not safe if I lend my phone to someone.
7) I found that my personal information in my phone will
be used in a way I feel improper if third-party apps that
I installed get it.
8) I found that some of my sensitive personal information
in my phone is being obtained/sought by many apps that
I installed.
We adopted seven-point Likert scale to formulate the re-
sponses, anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly
agree”. These statements do not base on any existing privacy
concerns, but are rather created based on the smartphone
privacy and activities related to the losing a phone, backup,
Table 1
Statements 
compared r훕 p
No. 1 with No. 5 0,356* 0,028
No. 2 with No. 6 0.476** 0,003
No. 3 with No. 7 0,372* 0,022
No. 4 with No. 8 0,032 0,848
Fig. 8: Correlation between the answers given before (to
statements 1 to 4) and after going through the Guided Tour
(statements 5 to 8). Compared were similar statements: state-
ment No. 1 and No. 5, No. 2 and No. 6, No. 3 and No. 7, No.
4 and No. 8. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed) ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
and personal information leakage. We prepared them to be
similar, yet not identical. Visual inspections of the histograms
showed that the data was not normally distributed. Thus, we
have adopted the Kendall’s tau non-parametric test [31] to find
the correlation between the two groups of answers. Results
showed that the first set of answers was positively strongly
correlated to the second one, except ones given to statements
4 and 8. As shown in the Figure 8, there was a significant
relationship between statement 1 and 5, statement 2 and 6,
statement 3 and 7 respectively. This means that the users
increased their awareness of privacy problems after taking the
Guided Tour.
3) Changes in Perception of Privacy: After confirming
the positive correlation, we wanted to know the difference
of privacy concerns after using Guided Tour and features in
Privacy Dashboard. We only used the set that had a significant
positive relationship. Due to the lack of normal distribution,
we used the Wilcoxon signed ranks test [32] to analyze the
data, which is a non-parametric version of a paired t-test on
non-normal distributions, working on the data collected using
a within-group design. We have found that the privacy concern
increased after usage of the tool. However, that change was
not as high as we have hoped, thus we have decided to slightly
change and extend the Guided Tour.
D. Discussions and Implications for Design
Our goal was to better understand how users perceive the
Privacy Dashboard, and if the features we introduced satisfy
their needs. Overall, we found that people thought not all of
our features are connected to privacy. They put each feature
into different categories, not limited to privacy & security
category. Results showed that participants preferred to group
five features as Privacy Dashboard and put this panel on the
Home Screen, or place them in both the Settings and the app.
We believe that this is connected to the ease of access – an
app on the Home Screen is easier to find and relate to, than
distributed settings.
Second, from the data of users’ learnability, performance
and satisfaction using privacy features, results showed that all
participants thought it was easy to learn, they were satisfied
with performing the tasks respectively and with features over-
all. However we found that over-flexibility is as bad as lack
of choice – users were lost in the amount of information in
the Adjustable Location Accuracy and Secondary-user Mode
cases. For that reason we have changed our design to be more
concise.
We are still not fully satisfied with the results of the Guided
Tour usage. Although people expressed it is easy to use and
they acted that it is worthy reading throughly, the increase of
the awareness was not as high as predicted.
1) The settings beyond the Settings: Once we start empow-
ering the users, we always need to make sure that we also
educate and help them with navigation in the new ecosystem.
That is why it was important to us to verify what is the most
intuitive placement of the Privacy Dashboard, and how should
we place it with respect to the settings. Our study showed that
gathering all privacy settings under the umbrella of a single
Privacy Dashboard app is the best arrangement.
2) Educating, advertising and tutoring: We recommend to
provide tutorials to explain the usage of new privacy features
like Adjustable Location Accuracy, Secondary-user Mode and
use of commands in Remote Privacy Protection. The current
Guided Tour did not provide as much help as we hoped
for, thus we decided to extend the feature with three main
focus areas. Instead of just educating the user the Guided
Tour should also advertise and tutor. Especially beginners need
more explanation on how to use the new elements and to be
guided to notice them.
3) Personalization of settings: Finally, to let users adapt
themselves to app ecosystem and personalization of settings,
we consider improving the functions for Adjustable Location
Accuracy and Secondary-user Mode, in the way of supporting
more sorting methods like mostly used, and recommendation
engine, based on user’s own data. Concerning Secondary-user
Mode, to go a step further, we consider to provide the fast
access function which can assist creating new profiles and
reusing these profiles for users.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the Privacy Dashboard: a tool
that we have created using method that we call “User-centric
privacy development”. We begun our work by doing a wide
scale study to verify and judge what is the current state of
privacy awareness of an average user. As an outcome of
this study we had an overview of what do people expect,
know and hope for. Next, having defined the gap between
users’ expectations and the capabilities that devices have, we
have designed and developed a prototype solution to meet the
requirements. Having the initial solution we have conducted
another study, to analyze how the prototype fits into the users’
needs. Based on that we have created a second iteration of
improvements and a final version of the tool. The feedback
from the users showed that the adaptation rate of features
developed is very high. It has also lead us to the changes in the
presentation of Location Accuracy and Secondary-user Mode
as well as the layout of the Guided Tour. This way we have
conducted research much wider, than would normally be done
when developing a solution, and made sure that our work is
not only of high academic quality, but also can be introduced
on product-scale and will be easily adapted. We believe that
involving users in the research and design phase, and building
solutions that meet their needs is crucial to bring the academic
work closer to the people.
As a result we have created a tool that addresses five basic
concerns of users – disclosure of their location, sharing data
with people who temporary use their phone, requirement of
registering in a central data-base in order to have a ”Find
My Device” feature, lack of choice when it comes to backup
methods. In addition to the improvements to users’ privacy
that our tool offers, and the fact it fits into their expectations,
we have also gathered in-depth understanding of peoples’
behavior patterns in the field. We have presented those results
in the paper. Our prototype runs on Firefox OS, with a plan
to investigate and develop each feature, hoping that we will
be able to collaborate towards introducing it on a wide scale.
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